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ABSTRACT Biometrics is commonly used in many automated verification systems offering several
advantages over traditional verification methods. Since biometric features are associated with individuals,
their leakage will violate individuals’ privacy, which can cause serious and continued problems as the
biometric data from a person are irreplaceable. To protect the biometric data containing privacy information,
a number of privacy-preserving biometric schemes (PPBSs) have been developed over the last decade,
but they have various drawbacks. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview of the
existing PPBSs and give guidance for future privacy-preserving biometric research. In particular, we explain
the functional mechanisms of popular PPBSs and present the state-of-the-art privacy-preserving biometric
methods based on these mechanisms. Furthermore, we discuss the drawbacks of the existing PPBSs and
point out the challenges and future research directions in PPBSs.
INDEX TERMS Privacy protection, biometric data, automated verification system.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advance of technology, automated identity verifica-
tion has been implemented in many real-world applications,
including granting access to shared computers, providing
personal information at airports, allowing access to highly
guarded areas such as nuclear facilities, and so on. Further-
more, because of the exponential growth of the Internet,
identity verification becomes an essential part in web-based
applications, such as online banking and online shopping.
Traditionally, passwords, identity cards and pin numbers are
used for the verification of individuals. These knowledge
and token based schemes have several disadvantages. For
example, a pin number can be shared by many people and an
identity card can be stolen by someone. Moreover, attackers
can get access to a system by guessing passwords and pin
numbers or disable the system by intentionally supplying the
incorrect information several times.
In order to overcome the issues in traditional verifica-
tion methods, human biological characteristics have been
exploited to develop biometric based verification systems.
Biometric verification is defined as the verification of an
individual based on the physical, chemical or behavioral
attributes of the person [1]. The biometric traits which can
be used for verification include fingerprints, face, voice, iris
and keystroke pattern. Themain advantage of using biometric
traits in identity verification systems is that they cannot be
easily shared or stolen. In addition to this, biometric schemes
are easier to use, as users do not need to remember passwords,
pin numbers or carry their identification cards.
Although the biometric based verification systems have
obvious advantages over the traditional ones, such systems
can risk the privacy of individuals if they are not designed
appropriately. For example, a biometric system may store
fingerprints or iris data. If the biometric data is exposed to an
attacker, the latter can be used for undesired purposes such
as impersonation. More importantly, since the biometric data
is derived from the biological characteristics of individuals,
they cannot be altered. Thus, the leakage of the biometric
data can cause serious and continuous threats to the privacy of
individuals. Therefore, the biometric data should be protected
in such a way that even if it is compromised, the attacker still
cannot gather any information which can breach individuals’
privacy. Besides, an attacker should not be able to login as a
genuine user.
In order to protect the biometric data which contains
individuals’ privacy information, some privacy-preserving
biometric schemes (PPBSs) have been developed in recent
years. These PPBSs can be classified into biometric encryp-
tion based schemes, cancelable biometric based schemes,
multi-modal and hybrid based schemes, and secure compu-
tation (SC) based schemes. Biometric encryption refers to
associating a digital key with biometric data. This can be
done by binding the key with the biometric data or generating
the key from the biometric data [2]. Cancelable biometrics
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involves using and storing intentionally distorted or trans-
formed biometric features extracted from biometric signals
in the biometric related applications. The utilization of pur-
posely altered biometric signals reduces the risk of expos-
ing the contents of the original biometric data [3]. While
multi-modal based schemes use more than one biometric
traits (e.g., iris and voice signals) for verification, hybrid
based schemes are developed by combining PPBSs such as
a biometric encryption based scheme and a cancelable bio-
metric based scheme. With respect to the SC based methods,
they guarantee high level of privacy of biometric data by using
encryption techniques such as homomorphic encryption and
garbled circuits.
Privacy-preserving biometric verification is a very active
research area and has been progressing fast over the last few
years. Recently, some survey/review type of papers about
privacy-preserving biometrics have been published in the
literature [4]–[15]. However, while these papers introduced
the general concept of privacy-preserving biometrics and
some PPBSs from different aspects, their scopes are limited.
For example, Belguechi et al. [4] neither discussed the popu-
lar PPBSs based on cryptographic techniques nor provided
detailed discerption of cancelable biometrics. In [5], there
was no mentioning of the robustness against attacks and the
tradeoff between the level of privacy and false acceptance
rate (FAR). Rane et al. [6] only very briefly mentioned
the possible attacks and performance measures but some
important PPBSs, such as hybrid PPBSs, were not included.
Similarly, Nandakumar and Jain [7] did not give details
about the schemes under the template protection category and
the SC based schemes. Compared with [4]–[7], the scopes
of [8]–[15] are even narrower. They only focus on some spe-
cific issues in privacy preserving biometrics, such as privacy
preserving multi-modal biometrics [8], SC [9], error con-
trol mechanisms related to PPBSs [10], adversarial machine
learning [11], biometric feature preprocessing [12], spoofing
attack [13], cancelable biometrics [14] and biometric signal
processing in encrypted domain [15].
Moreover, while standardization is an important issue
in privacy-preserving biometrics, it was not discussed
in [4], [5], and [7]–[15]. Although standardization is briefly
mentioned in [6], the problems and challenges encountered
in standardization were not illustrated. Furthermore, the
papers [4]–[6], [8]–[11], and [15] did not discuss in detail
the current challenges and future research directions in this
research area. The papers [7] and [12]–[14] only discussed
challenges and research directions in several specific subar-
eas, e.g., challenges in biometric features [12] and robustness
enhancement of cancelable PPBSs [14].
In this paper, we will give a comprehensive and up-to-date
overview of the popular and state-of-the-art PPBSs using a
generic framework. The shortcomings of these PPBSs will
be summarized and discussed, with particular focuses on the
robustness against attacks, the contradictory requirements of
privacy and accuracy, and the problems in standardization.
Furthermore, we will show the major challenges and project
the potential future research directions in PPBSs.Wewill also
suggest possible techniques to tackle these challenges and
handle future demands. Compared with [4]–[15], our paper
contains a number of unique and novel aspects, including
• much more comprehensive and up-to-date coverage of
the state-of-the-art PPBSs,
• detailed discussions of the problems in existing PPBSs,
where standardization is particularly highlighted, and
• detailed discussions of the challenges and future
research directions in PPBSs, together with suggested
techniques to tackle these challenges.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
basic framework and performance evaluation measures of
PPBSs are presented in Section II. In Section III, we cate-
gorize PPBSs and present a detailed discussion about each
category. The drawbacks of the existing PPBSs are summa-
rized and discussed in section IV, in terms of robustness,
level of privacy versus FAR, and standardization. Section V
show the challenges and future research directions in PPBSs,
together with suggested techniques to tackle these challenges,
and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BASIC FRAMEWORK AND PERFORMANCE
MEASURES OF PPBSs
A. BASIC FRAMEWORK
The main motivation behind PPBSs is to preserve the pri-
vacy of a user while maintaining the verification accuracy.
An effective and practical biometric system should exhibit
two important characteristics: irreversibility and unlinkabil-
ity. Irreversibility means that it should be difficult to recon-
struct the original biometric signal from the stored data
available to public. Unlinkability refers to the ability to create
many uncorrelated versions (or transforms) of the original
biometric signal. Wang et al. proposed a general framework
for PPBSs [16], which includes two parts: enrolment and
verification. This framework is applicable to most of the
existing PPBSs.
1) ENROLMENT
At the enrolment stage, a user provides a biometric signal as
an input. The important features of the biometric signal are
extracted using a feature extraction module. We denote the
extracted biometric features set by x. In order to protect the
privacy of biometric data, x will not be stored in a database.
Instead, x is processed in certain ways to produce the
so-called helper data, denoted by v. The helper data v is stored
in a database and plays an essential role at the verification
stage. This process should be designed in such a way that
it is almost impossible to retrieve x from v, which greatly
protects the privacy of biometric data. In these PPBSs, only
the biometric sample is required to perform identity veri-
fication at the verification stage. On the other hand, some
PPBSs employ a secret key sk , in different manners, to further
enhance the protection of biometric data privacy. In some
cases, the altered version of the secret key h(sk ) is also stored
in the database. In PPBSs, where secret key is used in addition
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to biometric signals are known as two factor verification
schemes, where both the biometric sample and the secret key
are needed at the verification stage.
2) VERIFICATION
At the verification stage, the received biometric signal,
together with the secret key in the case of two factor ver-
ification schemes, is used to extract the biometric features
and then produce the helper data. We denote the biometric
feature set and helper data obtained at the verification stage by
x ′ and v′, respectively. Based on the similarity between v′ and
its counterpart v obtained at the enrolment stage and stored
in the database, one decides whether a legitimate user or an
adversary is present. In some schemes, at the verification
stage, a secret key s′k is generated from the received biometric
signal and the stored helper data. Then the altered version of
the generated secret key h(s′k ) is obtained. For verification,
h(s′k ) and its counterpart h(sk ) are compared. Dodis et al. [17]
defined three metrics to compare the similarity between two
binary vectors: Hamming distance metric, set difference met-
ric and edit difference metric. These metrics are detailed as
follows:
• Hamming distance metric: The hamming distance
between two vectors V and V ′ (both represented in
binary form), denoted by dis(V ,V ′), is the number of
positions at which the strings V and V ′ differ.
• Set difference metric: The set difference distance
between two subsets V and V ′ is defined as
dis(V ,V ′) = |V | + |V ′| − 2|V ∩ V ′|
where ∩ stands for intersection operation and |A|
denotes the size of A.
• Edit difference metric: The edit difference distance
between V and V ′ is the minimum number of insertions
and deletions needed to convert V into V ′.
For example, if V = [1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1] and V ′ =
[1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0], the related Hamming distance and edit
difference distance can be directly obtained from their defini-
tions as 3 and 6, respectively, and the set difference distance
can be calculated as |V |+|V ′|−2|V∩V ′| = 7+7−2×4 = 6.
It should be noted that the majority of biometric veri-
fication schemes normally either use hamming distance or
set difference distance. This is because biometric features
or their altered counterparts can always be represented as
either a binary string (e.g., iris codes) or a set of features
(e.g., minutiae points for fingerprints).
B. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
PPBSs could suffer from noise in the received biometric sig-
nal, as the recordings of the same biometric signal recorded
at different times and under different conditions may vary
significantly. Incorrect decisions may come from the unsuc-
cessful genuine attempts or the successful imposter attempts.
The following measures are used to asses the accuracy of a
PPBS system, i.e., how reliably a system verifies a genuine
user and rejects an impostor:
• False rejection rate (FRR): FRR is the probability that
the system rejects a genuine user. It is also called the
probability of missed detection.
• FAR: FAR or false acceptance rate is the probability
that the system verifies a probe biometric signal which
comes from a person different from the enrolled identity.
It is also called the probability of false detection. For any
given biometric system, there exists a trade-off between
FAR and FRR.
• Equal error rate (EER): EER is a value used to
express the performance of a biometric system. For a
given biometric system, FRR and FAR are inversely
related and by adjusting the system parameters, either
FRR or FAR can be reduced at the expense of the other.
In order to represent the performance of a given system
quantitatively by a single value, EER is defined as the
point at which FAR is equal to FRR. EER should be as
low as possible for biometric systems.
• Successful attack rate (SAR): SAR is the probability
that the system authenticates an adversary instead of a
legitimate candidate, where the adversary is aided by
some side information consisting of the stored helper
data and/or the secret key. The SAR is always greater
than or equal to FAR as additional information improves
the adversary’s ability to falsely authenticate him/her.
Regarding the performance of PPBSs in relation to privacy,
the commonly used measures are as follows:
• Privacy leakage: Privacy leakage refers to the leakage of
information about the biometric signal when the stored
helper data is compromised.
• Non-invertibility: Non-invertiblity refers to the inability
to reconstruct the biometric features from the helper
data. It can be measured by the conditional Shannon
entropy of the biometric features given the helper data.
In the context of biometric encryption based schemes,
the amount of information which helper data reveals
about the biometric features is referred as entropy loss.
Entropy loss is a useful measure to compare different
PPBSs [7].
• Revocability and non-linkability: Revocability refers to
the renewability of helper data in case it has been
compromised. Non-linkability refers to preventing cross
matching of helper data across different applications.
Although many PPBSs claim to have the revocability
and non-linkability properties, the analysis in [16] shows
these schemes do not satisfy the condition of revocability
and non-linkability.
In addition to the above measures related to accuracy and
privacy, Computational complexity and storage requirement
are also important to a PPBS. These measures are outlined
below:
• Computational complexity: Computational complexity
can be measured by means of the required resources
(e.g., processor speed, memory, disk space, etc.) and
processing time. It plays an important role in determin-
ing the usability of a PPBS.
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• Storage requirement: Storage requirement refers to the
number of bits required to store the helper data and/or
the secret key.
III. PRIVACY PRESERVING BIOMETRIC SCHEMES
Over the last decade, many PPBSs have been developed to
protect the privacy of biometric signals. These schemes can
be broadly grouped as biometric encryption based schemes,
cancelable biometric based schemes, multi-modal and hybrid
based schemes, and SC based schemes.
A. BIOMETRIC ENCRYPTION BASED SCHEMES
Biometric encryption originated from the idea of protecting
the privacy of a biometric signal by encrypting it using a
cryptographic technique. This leads to very low level of FAR
and thus makes the biometric systems more secure from
hackers. The major problem in combining biometrics with
cryptography is the inherent variation of biometric features,
which is caused by the imperfect nature of biometric feature
extraction and matching algorithms. Since it is difficult to
produce exactly the same biometric features at the verifi-
cation stage, the exact matching of biometric features is
usually impossible. Due to this reason, the standard crypto-
graphic approaches cannot be used in biometric verification
systems directly. To cope with the variation in biometric fea-
tures, fuzzy based techniques were introduced into biometric
verification systems.
In the enrolment process, a discrete feature set is extracted
from the original biometric signal and a secret key is com-
bined with the biometric feature set through a binding
algorithm. The resulting representation and the hash value of
the key are stored in the database but the biometric feature
set and the key are discarded. Binding should be performed
in a secure way such that neither the key nor the biometric
information can be retrieved, even when the stored data is
compromised. In the verification process, if the presented
biometric signal is sufficiently close to the stored biometric
data, the original secret key can be retrieved and the user
can be authenticated based on that. The levels of privacy
and verification accuracy rely on the length of the secret
key and the encryption algorithm [18]. The major challenge
between binding and retrieval of the algorithm is to bridge the
gap between the fuzziness of biometric and the exactness of
cryptography.
The operation of biometric encryption can be classified
into two modes: key binding mode and key generating mode.
1) KEY BINDING MODE BASED SCHEMES
In the key binding mode, a randomly generated secret key
and the biometric features are combined monolithically using
cryptographic framework. In other words, the secret key
is encrypted using biometric features. The biometrically
encrypted data (which is the helper data in this context) and
the hash value of the secret key are stored. At the verification
end, the secret key is retrieved using the stored biometrically
encrypted data and the received biometric signal. During the
verification process, the hash value of the retrieved secret key
is compared with the stored hash value of the secret key.
Many PPBSs are based on the biometric key binding
mode [19]–[35]. In the early days, two PPBSs called
Mytec1 and Mytec2 were proposed [19], in which an altered
feature set is generated from biometric signals using a random
array. Then, this altered feature set is linked with a secret key
to create a lookup table. At the enrolment stage, the lookup
table, the hash value of the secret key and the details about the
random array are stored. These stored data together with the
received biometric signal are used for verification. The major
drawback of Mytec1 and Mytec2 is their poor verification
accuracy, caused by their high sensitivity to noise. For the
PPBSs in [20]–[35], they take advantage of either fuzzy vault
or fuzzy commitment based techniques.
Key BindingMode Based PPBSs Using Fuzzy Vault: Fuzzy
vault is a popular error resistant technique initially proposed
by Jules and Sudan [20]. It is designed toworkwith unordered
sets (e.g., important feature points, known as minutiae points,
in fingerprints) and has the ability to deal with interclass
variation which is commonly encountered in biometric data.
Fig. 1 illustrates the basic key binding mode based PPBS
using fuzzy vault. First of all, from the biometric signal such
as a fingerprint, a biometric feature set x is extracted. Besides,
based on the secret key sk , a corresponding polynomial p
is generated, e.g., the elements of sk could be used to form
the coefficients of p. Then, the projection of the unordered
biometric feature set x on the polynomial p is calculated.
After that, the random points which do not lie on the poly-
nomial p, called chaff points, are added to the calculated
projected points. Denote both sets of points (i.e., the projected
points on the polynomial and the added chaff points) as v. In a
PPBS using fuzzy vault, the helper data v is popularly known
as the vault. Here, the chaff points are added to conceal the
polynomial p from an attacker. In addition to v, the hash value
of the secret key, denoted as h(sk ), is also stored during the
enrolment process. At the verification stage, to successfully
unlock the vault v, a set of biometric features x ′ is needed.
If the received biometric feature set x ′ largely overlaps with x,
one can locate adequate number of points in v, which lie on
the polynomial p. From p, the secret key s′k can be extracted.
Finally, verification is done by comparing the hash value of
the derived secret key, h(s′k ), and the stored h(sk ).
The first working key binding mode based PPBS using
fuzzy vault was introduced by Clancy et al. [21], where the
pre-aligned feature set from fingerprints was assumed. Due
to this assumption, the practicality of this method is very
limited. To remove this assumption, Nandakumar et al. intro-
duced a method utilizing the high curvature points derived
from the orientation field of fingerprints [22]. Differently,
to overcome the alignment issue, Li et al. proposed to
fuse the local features and local structures to withstand
geometric transformations such as rotation and transla-
tion [23]. In [24], the orientation information of the bio-
metric data was employed to increase verification accuracy.
While verification accuracy can also be improved by
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FIGURE 1. Illustration of basic key binding mode based PPBS using fuzzy vault.
(a) Enrolment; (b) Verification.
increasing the number of chaff points, the increase of
chaff points will inevitably raise computational complex-
ity. In [25], Nguyen et al. proposed a mechanism to gen-
erate chaff points in a faster and more efficient way.
It is worth mentioning that although the PPBSs using
fuzzy vault were initially applied to fingerprints, they
are also applicable to other biometric signals such as
iris [26], palmprints [27], and face biometrics [28].
Key Binding Mode Based PPBSs Using Fuzzy Commit-
ment: The basic key binding mode based PPBSs using fuzzy
commitment was reported in [29] and Fig. 2 shows its block
diagram. In the enrolment process, the biometric feature set x
and a secret key sk are used as two input components, where
sk is usually a codeword generated using an error correction
code. From x and sk , a difference vector v (i.e., the helper
data) is computed in certain way. For example, v can be
obtained using the XOR operation, i.e., v = sk ⊕ x, where
⊕ denotes XOR operation. The obtained difference vector
v is stored in the database, together with the hash value of
the codeword, h(sk ). At the verification end, the codeword is
generated using the received biometric signal and the stored
difference vector v. Then, the verification is done by compar-
ing the hash value of the generated codeword and the stored
counterpart.
FIGURE 2. Block diagram of basic key binding mode based PPBSs using
fuzzy commitment. (a) Enrolment; (b) Verification.
Many modifications have been made to the basic
fuzzy commitment based PPBS to improve performance.
Bringer et al. used two-dimensional iterative min-sum code
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and binary Reed-Muller code to improve the efficiency of
the decoding process [30]. In [31], the context-based reliable
component selection is used to extract the secret key from
iris-codes. In [32], the randomized dynamic quantization
transformation is utilized to create the binary form of the
fingerprint features and the Reed-Solomon code is employed
to improve the decoding performance. In [33], Nandakumar
used the focal points of high curvature regions to obtain align-
ment in fingerprint features and used a binary fixed-length
feature representation. In addition to iris fingerprint, the fuzzy
commitment concept is also applied in other biometrics such
as face biometrics [34] and online signatures [35]. Since
the fuzzy commitment based PPBSs normally use relatively
shorter codewords, they are relatively vulnerable to brute
force attack, which guesses the codewords through exhaustive
search.
2) KEY GENERATING MODE BASED SCHEMES
In the key generating mode, the secret key is generated
directly from a biometric feature set. While it appears to
be a simple and attractive proposition, its implementation is
challenging as it requires high key stability and entropy. Here,
key stability refers to the ability of repeatedly generating
the same key from a given biometric signal and key entropy
relates to the number of possible keyswhich can be generated.
Since biometric signals are sensitive to noise, it is difficult
to maintain high key stability. Having high key stability and
entropy simultaneously is even more difficult as key stability
and key entropy are inversely related.
One type of key generating mode based PPBSs employed
the concept of user specific quantization methods [36].
In [37], Chang et al. proposed a method for stable key gen-
eration from biometric signals. In particular, a collection of
biometric features of an authentic user is used to register the
user, where the user specific feature transform is conducted in
such a way that the transformed feature space of the authentic
user is compact while those of the impostors are diverse.
In this way, the transformed feature space of the authentic
user is distinguishable from those of the imposters and each
feature can contribute to one or more bits of information into
the cryptographic key generation process. This helps in mak-
ing long and stable keys. More key generating mode based
PPBSs employing the user specific quantization methods can
be found in [38]–[40].
Another type of key generating mode based PPBS utilized
fuzzy extractor [17] and Fig. 3 shows its block diagram. In the
enrolment process, the biometric feature set x and a seed are
considered as inputs. From x, the helper data v is produced
via a mechanism known as secure sketch. This mechanism
involves the quantized random projections of x and an error
correction code with parity check matrix. In addition, from x
and the seed, a uniform random string sk is generated using
a random extractor, where sk acts as a secret key. The helper
data v and the hash value of the secret key, h(sk ), are stored in
the database. At the verification stage, one first extracts x ′
from the received biometric signal, which is often noisy.
FIGURE 3. Block diagram of key generating mode based PPBS using
fuzzy extractor.
Then, the original feature set x is recovered by exploiting x ′
and v. Based on x and the seed, a random extractor can be
applied to generate the secret key s′k and then its hash h(s′k )
is computed. Finally, verification is performed by comparing
h(s′k ) with h(sk ). In [17], the fuzzy extractors were constructed
using three metrics: Hamming distance, set difference and
edit distance.
While the PPBSs using fuzzy extractors usually require
less storage space than other PPBSs do, they have some
disadvantages. Firstly, fuzzy extractors cannot be reused mul-
tiple times for the same biometric signal due to their low
key entropy, which significantly reduces their usability in
practice [41], [42]. Secondly, fuzzy extractors are vulnerable
to the uncertainty in the biometric signal, especially in the
case of fingerprints, and the misalignment in the received bio-
metric signal [43]. Thirdly, significant identity information
leakage could occur in fuzzy extractors [44].
B. CANCELABLE BIOMETRIC BASED SCHEMES
Cancelable biometrics refers to adding a repeatable
distortion to the biometric signal systematically and inten-
tionally, in order to protect the user’s privacy [3]. The distor-
tion is controlled by some parameters derived from a secret
key, where the secret key can be a pseudo random number,
a password or some other random key. The helper data v is
created by applying the distortion to the biometric feature
set x and stored in the database. Following the approach used
in the enrolment process, one can perform verification by
creating v′ from the received biometric feature set x ′ and
then comparing the generated v′ with the stored v. If the
helper data v is compromised, the distortion parameters can
be changed to generate a new set of helper data. The distortion
functions are designed in such a way that it is computationally
difficult for an adversary to recover the original biomet-
ric feature set x. Among the existing cancelable biometric
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based schemes, most of them exploit either biohashing or
non-invertible transform.
FIGURE 4. Block diagram of generating biohash value.
1) CANCELABLE BIOMETRIC BASED
PPBSs USING BIOHASHING
A biohashing process consists of two steps. In the first step,
a preprocessing is carried out on the biometric feature set
in order to make the biometric feature invariant to small
variations in the input biometric signal. For example, in the
case of face biometrics, Fourier-Mellin transform can be used
to make the feature vector invariant to geometric variations
such as rotation and translation. In the second step, a user
specific secret key is used to generate a random vector. Then,
a biohash value is generated by comparing the inner prod-
uct of the generated random vector and the feature vector
extracted against a predefined threshold. Fig. 4 shows the
block diagram of generating biohash value. At the verification
end, by following the process used at the enrolment stage,
a biohash value can be generated from the received biometric
signal and the secret key given by the user. Afterwards, the
verification is done by comparing the newly computed bio-
hash value with the stored biohash value. Some representative
PPBSs based on biohashing can be found in [45]–[47].
In a PPBS using biohashing, the user defined secret key
increases the entropy of the biometric feature set. It is almost
impossible to reconstruct the original biometric feature set
without knowing the secret key. This is primarily due to
the usage of dot product and the threshold based mecha-
nisms [48]. Although the aforementioned PPBSs using bio-
hashing offer good privacy preservation, they have a major
issue, which is that a person stealing the secret key is able to
compromise the system. As shown in [49], when biohashing
is operated under the hypothesis of stolen secret key, the sys-
tem performance in terms of FARmoves form 7.3% to 10.3%.
To address this issue, Lumini et al. proposed several solutions
for augmenting the length of the secret key [50]. Besides,
in [51], Nanni and Lumni used the invariant local binary pat-
tern texture operator for fingerprints to improve verification
accuracy [51]. However, since this approach utilizes minutiae
comparator for alignment, it results in lower level of privacy.
2) CANCELABLE BIOMETRIC BASED PPBSs USING
NON-INVERTIBLE TRANSFORM
In a cancelable biometric based PPBS using non-invertible
transform, the biometric feature set is secured by applying
a non-invertible transformation function [52]. The non-
invertible transform refers to a one-way function,F(x), which
is easy to compute (in polynomial time) but difficult to
invert.1 The parameters of the transformation function are
defined by a secret key which must be available at the time
of verification. The main characteristic of this approach is
that even if the secret key or/and the transformed feature
set are known, it is computationally challenging, in terms
of brute force complexity, for an adversary to recover the
original biometric feature set. During the enrolment process,
the transformed biometric feature set, i.e., the helper data v,
is stored in the database. At the verification stage, the received
biometric features and the secret key are exploited to gen-
erate the transformed feature set v′, and then v′ is com-
pared with the stored counterpart v for verification. It should
be noted that in a PPBS using non-invertible transform,
non-invertibility and verification accuracy are two contradic-
tory requirements [53].
Various transforms have been used in PPBSs and their
impact on verification accuracy is investigated. In [52],
Ratha et al. compared cartesian, polar and surface folding
transforms in the context of the minutiae positions for finger-
prints. It is shown that the verification system performance
under transformation remains almost the same as without
transformation while maintaining the irrevocability. It is fur-
ther revealed [54] that in Ratha’s surface folding transform
based mechanism, the original biometric feature set can be
regenerated when the transformed biometric feature set and
the secret key are known. In [55], Teoh et al. proposed a
cancelable formulation, where the biometric feature set is
first distorted in a revocable manner using a non-inventible
transform. Then, the distorted feature vector is projected
onto random subspaces using a user-specific pseudo random
number which acts as a secret key. Regarding the perfor-
mance perspective, three different scenarios were considered:
normal, stolen pseudo random number and compromised
distorted feature vector. In [56],Wang et al. proposed amech-
anism to transform the original biometric feature set using
random transforms, including random additive transform,
random multiplicative transforms and random projections.
The random transforms in combination with sorted index
numbers approach satisfy the condition of revocability and
non-invertibility. Hence, among the transforms considered,
the random transforms provide greater level of privacy.
Furthermore, adaptive bloom filters were utilized in [57]
achieve efficient and alignment-invariant biometric compar-
ison, which is also irreversible, with particular focus on iris
verification.
1Given F(x), the probability of finding x in polynomial time is very small.
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C. MULTI-MODAL AND HYBRID BASED SCHEMES
Achieving high verification accuracy is a primary objective
for all PPBSs. Intuitively, using more than one biometric trait
would be beneficial to improve verification accuracy, which
leads to multi-modal and hybrid based PPBSs.
1) MULTI-MODAL BASED PPBSs
As shown in [58], combining two biometric traits, e.g., ear
and face, face and fingerprint, etc. help deal with problems
like intra-class variability, inter-class similarity, data qual-
ity and sensitivity to noise. Solving or moderating these
problems in return improves verification accuracy. By com-
bining diverse biometric traits in different ways, various
multi-modal based PPBSs have been developed. The PPBS
in [59] combines fingerprint and voice using fuzzy logic.
In [60], face and online handwritten signature were com-
bined using linear discriminant analysis. To ensure that the
significant features were used in a balanced manner, a genetic
algorithm with modified fitness function was utilized in [60].
In [61], Nadheen et al. employed principle component anal-
ysis to extract features from ear and iris, and the extracted
biometric features were jointly exploited using the score
level fusion. More multi-modal based PPBSs can be found
in [62] and [63].
2) HYBRID BASED PPBSs
In PPBSs, both biometric encryption and cancelable
biometrics have their own pros and cons. The underlying idea
behind the hybrid concept is to combine different schemes
appropriately to take advantages of their strengths. For exam-
ple, one type of cancelable biometric based PPBSs use a
non-invertible transform function to transform the biometric
feature set and do verification comparison in the transformed
domain. The drawback of these schemes are that the transfor-
mation sometimes tends to break the underlying structure, as
in the case of fingerprints, thus reducing the verification accu-
racy. On the other hand, a fuzzy extractor uses error correction
code to recover a uniform random stringwith the assistance of
helper data. The problem with fuzzy extractor is that the error
correction code reduces the verification accuracy. To get the
best of both approaches, one can apply the error correction
techniques in fuzzy extractor to cancelable biometric based
schemes to get better verification performance [63]. More
hybrid based PPBSs are shown in [64]–[67], aiming to better
protect the privacy of biometric feature set and to increase the
verification accuracy.
D. SC BASED SCHEMES
As shown in the above subsections, most PPBSs such as
those based on biometric encryption and cancelable bio-
metrics achieve biometric feature protection at the cost of
lowering verification accuracy. Differently, SC based PPBSs
aim to protect biometric feature set at the expense of high
computational complexity and storage requirement. This is
achieved by doing computations in an encrypted domain.
Depending on the application scenarios, the computation
result can be a boolean value, the index of a closest element,
or a probabilistic measure of the similarity (or dissimilarity)
between encrypted feature sets. Compared with biometric
encryption and cancelable biometric based PPBSs, SC based
PPBSs can achieve higher level of privacy and verification
accuracy as they utilize well-established encryption algo-
rithms. They are particularly useful in some applications,
such as in large scale verification systems where the client
and server engage in a biometric verification process but not
reveal to each other any biometric data. However, their usage
in most real life applications is prohibited due to their high
computational complexity and storage requirement. While
different techniques have been used in SC based PPBSs,
homomorphic encryption and garbled circuit are two repre-
sentative ones.
1) SC BASED PPBSs USING HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Homomorphic encryption was first introduced by
Rivest et al. in 1978 [68]. In SC based PPBSs using homo-
morphic encryption, the biometric feature set is encrypted
using homomorphic encryption via a public key. The public
key is only used for encryption and it cannot be employed
for decryption. The encrypted biometric feature set is stored
in a data base. During the verification phase, the biometric
feature set of the received biometric signal is extracted and
then encrypted using the public key. Verification is con-
ducted by comparing the similarity, by means of a distance
matrix, between the received encrypted feature set and the
stored encrypted feature set. A privacy-preserving compar-
ison protocol is used to determine whether the distance is
below a threshold or not and only the verification system
knows the threshold. Due to the usage of homomorphic
encryption, the similarity between the biometric signals used
in enrolment and verification processes is reflected in their
encrypted counterparts. This is vital as the biometric feature
sets used in enrolment and verification processes are not
going to be identical due to noise and misalignments. Several
more recent homomorphic encryption methods were reported
in [69]–[72].
There were also verification applications, in which par-
tially homomorphic encryption was used. A system is con-
sidered as partially homomorphic, if it exhibits either additive
or multiplicative homomorphism, but not both [69]. The most
popular form of partially homomorphic encryption is Paillier
cryptosystem, which possesses additive homomorphism.
In order to improve verification accuracy and privacy, Paillier
cryptosystem is also used together with other multiparty com-
putation techniques. For example, in the Scifi project [73],
Paillier cryptosystem and another SC technique called obliv-
ious transfer [74] are used to implement a face identifica-
tion system under secure computation. However, the current
Paillier cryptosystem is in general very slow, limiting its
applications in practice.
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2) SC BASED PPBSs USING GARBLED CIRCUIT
In a biometric based verification system, a large amount of
helper data corresponding to different users is often stored
in the database. If the system wants, it can track or monitor
a user’s activity with respect to verification. For example,
if a user verifies his identity at different branches of a partic-
ular bank, the verification system may determine the user’s
geographic location to a certain extent. The garbled circuit
can be used to deal with this issue. The garbled circuit theory
was introduced by Yao in 1986 [75] and has been commonly
used in private computing. It allows the evaluation of binary
circuits, such as the circuits made up by AND and OR gates,
on inputs privately owned by two parties involved in the
computation. The result of the evaluation is made available
to either one or both parties while the intermediate values
cannot be discovered by any of them. The inherent nature of
garbled circuit enables it to prevent the verification system
from knowing which helper data is compared. Consequently,
the system does not know who is doing the verification.
Blanton et al. proposed a privacy-preserving protocol for
iris and fingerprint matching [76], in which the garbled circuit
concept was exploited. In [77], Chun et al. presented another
garbled circuit based protocol for biometric authentication.
The protocol in [77] is secure in the honest-but-curious model
but its performance in computation is not satisfactory as it
takes a relatively long time for execution.
IV. MAJOR PROBLEMS IN EXISTING PPBSs
In this section, we analyze the major problems of the existing
PPBSs in terms of robustness, level of privacy versus FAR,
and standardization.
A. ROBUSTNESS
Over the last few years, PPBSs have become a vital part of
information security systems due to the increasing demand
of privacy protection. A PPBS should not only protect the
privacy of biometric data but also ensure very high verifica-
tion accuracy, i.e., verifying the legitimate users and resist-
ing any attempts by imposters to get unauthorized access.
PPBSs could be attacked by attackers in various ways, aiming
to either get authenticated fraudulently or to compromise
the user privacy [78], [79]. Although the existing PPBSs
were designed to resist as many attacks as possible, they do
not have adequate successful verification rate under popular
attacks.
The attacks on biometric verification systems can be classi-
fied in many ways. By considering the sources of attacks and
the attackers’ goals, the major attacks on privacy-preserving
biometric verification systems can be categorized as follows.
• FAR attack: In biometric based verification systems,
false acceptance occurs due to interclass correlation,
i.e., the features extracted from two different biomet-
ric signals using a given algorithm may have similar
characteristics. For example, if a system has a false
acceptance rate of 0.01%, it means that it is possible to
get unauthorized access if 104 trials are carried out to
compare the features from different users. Therefore, an
attacker who has access to a large biometric database
can exploit this property to attack a verification system.
Such attack is called FAR attack.
• Linkage attack: The advantage of using biometric fea-
ture set for verification is that it creates a direct con-
nection between a user and his/her identity. However,
if a user is registered on different verification systems
using the same biometric trait, the user’s activities could
be traced online [80]. Linkage attack aims to compro-
mise the user’s privacy by cross-matching the helper
data related to the user but stored in different system
databases.
• Hill climbing attacks: The hill climbing attack can be
exerted on the biometric verification systems which
reveal thematching level between the received biometric
feature set and the stored helper data. For example, in a
face based verification system, if information about the
similarity score between the received face image and its
stored counterpart is somehow disclosed, it is possible
for an attacker to regenerate the face image using a
recursive scheme [81].
• Brute force attack: Brute force attack, basically an
exhaustive search on all possible combinations of keys
or passwords, is theoretically able to crack any verifica-
tion system which depends on encrypted data. To launch
this attack, massive amount of computational power is
needed. As an example of brute force attack, it was used
to crack fuzzy vault [82], with which the secret key could
be recovered.
B. LEVEL OF PRIVACY VERSUS FAR
The main objective of PPBSs is to preserve the privacy of
users while ensuring lower FAR. Many studies have been
conducted to investigate the level of privacy against FAR from
an information theoretic prospective [83]–[85]. These studies
show that in the existing PPBSs, higher level of privacy is
often achieved at the cost of increasing FAR. For example,
the biometric encryption based PPBSs usually obtain lower
FAR by increasing the size of the secret key as it is hard for
an attacker to guess the key with longer length [86], [87].
However, on the other hand, a longer key length could
decrease the level of privacy, because the helper data gen-
erated using a key with longer length could contain more
information about the original biometric signal. Thus, there
is a tradeoff between privacy and FAR.
C. STANDARDIZATION
In recently years, PPBSs have been attracting more and more
attentions from researchers in academia and industry. From
the view point of system implementation, the enrolment mod-
ule of a typical PPBS includes sensors, quality assessment
and feature extraction units and its verification module con-
tains feature extraction, matching and decision making units.
Since there are a range of modules and units involved in
the implementation of the PPBS, the compatibility among
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these modules and units is very important. This inevitably
makes standardization an essential part in PPBS design and
implementation.
Standardizing biometric information protection was first
mentioned in ISO/IEC 24745 [88], which gave general guid-
ance on low FAR and privacy-compliant management and
processing of biometric information. This standardization
divides the stored data in the enrolment phase of a biometric
verification system into auxiliary data and a pseudonymous
identifier. Here, the auxiliary data denotes helper data and
the pseudonymous identifier commonly refers to an altered
version of the secret key. ISO/IEC 24745 also lists the poten-
tial attacks on the biometric verification systems, such as data
hacking during the data transfer between different modules.
Furthermore, it gives directions on the implementation of
PPBSs, including the way of storing data and the commu-
nication between different modules. In relation to privacy
aspect, ISO/IEC 24745 defines irreversibility, unlinkability
and confidentiality, in order to ensure that the users’ biometric
features do not go to the hands of an unintended person or an
attacker.
The standardization of performance metrics and assess-
ment methodologies was addressed in ISO/IEC 19795 [89].
It defines performance metrics such as FAR and FRR.
Recently, the standardization of performance testing
of biometric verification schemes has been defined in
WD 30136 [90]. The performance metrics related to handling
different PPBSs, such as privacy leakage and successful
attack rate, have also been defined in WD 30136.
Although there are attempts to standardized modules in
PPBSs, this standardization process is in the early stage.
More comprehensive and generalized frameworks should be
developed to standardize variousmodules in PPBSs. This will
surely assist the industrial deployment of PPBSs by providing
compatibility among different modules in biometric schemes.
The main problems associated with the standardization of
biometrics can be summarized as follows.
• Since there are many different schemes used in privacy
preserving biometric systems, it is difficult to enforce
standardization.
• The involvement of various parties, such as manufactur-
ing industries, security agencies and research institutes,
makes it hard to implement standardization within a
reasonable time frame.
• Standardization should not compromise either the pri-
vacy or FAR of PPBSs.
• Certain tools and mechanisms in PPBSs are unique,
thus it is challenging to have a generalized standardized
framework.
V. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF PPBSs
Although some PPBSs have been proposed in recent years,
the research on PPBSs is still far from mature, alongside
with many open issues and challenges. All these should be
addressed before PPBSs can take over the traditional veri-
fication schemes in real world applications. In this section,
we will discuss some of the major challenges and future
research directions of PPBSs.
• Optimum PPBS selection: It is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to develop a PPBS which can sat-
isfy all performance requirements, such as low FRR,
FAR, privacy leakage and computational complexity.
However, depending on the application scenario, some
of the requirements are more crucial than the others.
So, it is important to develop a generalized framework
to find the optimum privacy-preserving scheme for a
given application scenario. This can be implemented by
developing aweighted cost (or objective) functionwhich
utilizes the objective measures of the requirements.
• Alignment of biometric features: The performance of
PPBSs relies on the alignment of biometric features in
one way or the other. As we have discussed, in PPBSs,
the original biometric feature set is discarded and only
the altered biometric feature set, known as helper data,
is stored. In some cases, it is difficult to successfully
verify the received biometric signal from the stored
helper data alone and some extra information should
be used to ensure alignment. Enbo et al. proposed a
fuzzy vault mechanism based on geometric hashing for
fingerprint feature alignment [91] but it has high FRR.
To deal with the problem of biometric feature misalign-
ment, one needs to either ensure alignment in the trans-
formed domain or make system matching performance
independent of alignment. A potential solution to this
is to exploit the transforms which were used to resist
geometric attacks in image watermarking.
• Utilization of unconventional biometric traits:
Nowadays, more and more people are using various
interactive interfaces for various purposes, ranging from
using touch-screen based smart phone/notebooks to
using motion sensor based gaming devices. To facilitate
these new applications, there are demands to develop
novel PPBSs which could employ unconventional bio-
metric traits such as palmprint, keystroke dynamics and
body-movement-pattern [1]. When selecting new bio-
metric traits, factors such as permanence, measurability,
uniqueness and reliability should be considered.
• Attack tolerance and analysis of accuracy: We have
discussed several common attacks on PPBSs but there
is no doubt that new attacks will emerge in future appli-
cations. New methods which can resist these attacks
need to be developed and evaluated. Moreover, some
objective measures should be proposed to quantify the
severity of the attacks. This will aid in adjusting the
parameters of PPBSs according to the robustness
requirement of the intended application.
• Standardization of performance metrics: When imple-
menting PPBSs in large scale, compatibility between
different schemes and modules can become a very chal-
lenging issue. Unified standards are needed in the devel-
opment of such systems to guarantee interoperability.
Some preliminary work on standardization has been
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reported in the literature such as in [90] but much more
needs to be done.
• Novel privacy-preserving techniques: Some privacy pre-
serving methods have been proposed for PPBSs, such
as fuzzy vault and biohashing. However, they failed
to satisfy some important requirements, e.g., low pri-
vacy leakage and low computational complexity. Hence,
novel privacy-preserving techniques should be invented
to protect the privacy of the stored biometric data. This
could be investigated from different aspects. For exam-
ple, digital watermarking techniques can be used to
protect the privacy of biometric features by hiding them
into a cover multimedia object. Besides, since digital
watermarking techniques can correctly extract the hid-
den biometric features using a secret key, even under
attacks, they can also provide high level of verification
accuracy.
• Extension of privacy-preserving biometrics to other
applications:One of such extensions can be the security
of the stored private data on cloud. For instance, the key
generated in biometric encryption can be used to encrypt
and decrypt the data before storing and retrieving it on
the cloud. Privacy preserving biometrics can also be
used in applications like e-business, where information
is a vital asset and must be kept in a trusted environment
and efficiently managed only by authorized parties. The
main challenge is to develop a framework which ensures
data exchanging in a secure manner.
• Adjustable PPBSs: In the near future, most software will
have at least two different versions: mobile version and
cloud version. The mobile version should have attributes
such as low computational complexity and low stor-
age requirement while the cloud version should provide
exceptional verification performance and high robust-
ness against attacks. Hence, the future PPBSs should
be flexible in a way that its characteristics should be
adjustable according to the necessity of the application.
VI. CONCLUSION
Privacy preservation in biometric based verification sys-
tems is a growing area of research with many challenges.
This paper first outlined the basic framework and perfor-
mancemeasures of PPBSs. Then it provided a comprehensive
review of the existing PPBSs, including biometric encryption
based schemes, cancelable biometric based schemes, multi-
modal and hybrid based schemes, and SC based schemes.
The problems associated with the existing PPBSs were also
summarized and discussed. Furthermore, we highlighted the
challenges and future directions of PPBSs. It is hoped that
the review and analysis presented in this paper can help and
motivate researchers to develop more effective and efficient
PPBSs in the future.
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